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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an interlocutory appeal in a felony criminal matter,
involving the appeal of a decision of the Fourth District Court of
Juab County not to suppress evidence against Defendants which
Defendants claimed was seized in violation of their constitutional
rights.

Jurisdiction of this court to hear such an appeal is

granted by § 78-2a-3(2)(e) U.C.A. (1953) as amended.

The rule of

appellate procedure governing interlocutory appeals is Rule 5; and
1

permission to proceed with this appeal has been previously granted
by this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue presented in this appeal is as follows:
"Whether the consent [to the search of Defendant's motor
vehicle] was obtained by police exploitation of the prior
illegality . . . or, in other words, whether the 'taint'
of the Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently
attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence."
(State v. Ziegleman unpublished memorandum decision dated
September 9, 1993, at p.2).
The Findings of Fact in such cases will not be disturbed
unless those findings were "clearly erroneous". The
Conclusions of Law made by the court, after examining the
facts, are reviewed "under a correctness standard." See
State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
AND REGULATION WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States of
America.
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,
houses,
papers,
and
effects,
against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Amendment XIV § 1 to the Constitution of the United States of
America.
[Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
2

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Article I § 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
[Unreasonable
warrant.]

searches

forbidden

—

Issuance

of

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
§ 77-7-15 U.C.A. as amended
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he
has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal in a felony criminal matter.
Defendant and Appellant is charged in a criminal Information filed
in the Fourth District Court, Juab County, with a second degree
felony of knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute, contrary to
Appellant

Brent

Ziegleman,

and

§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) U.C.A.
his

Co-Defendant,

Michael

McNaughton, who has not joined in this interlocutory appeal, filed
3

motions to suppress evidence, and Appellant filed a Memorandum in
Support of that Motion.

A hearing on the Motion to Suppress

Evidence was held before Hon. George E. Ballif, on November 5,
1991. By order of May 7, 1992, the Motion to Suppress Evidence was
denied. A Petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal
was filed on May 29, 1992; and an order granting permission to file
the interlocutory appeal was made by this Court on July 1, 1992.
By unpublished memorandum opinion, dated September 9, 1993,
this Court reversed the decision of Judge Ballif, and remanded for
further proceedings in the trial court.

This Court upheld the

validity of the initial stop of Defendant; but the Court held that
the continued detention of Defendant for matters outside the scope
of the initial stop, and outside the scope of an investigation as
to whether the vehicle was stolen, was illegal.

Based on the

legality of the continued detention, this Court remanded to the
trial court for a further determination of whether the consent to
search was tainted by the prior illegality. The trial court, Hon.
Lynn W. Davis, found that "there would be absolutely no deterrent
effect accomplished by suppressing the cocaine seized from the
vehicle."

Based on the lack of a deterrent effect on further

illegal police conduct, the trial court denied Defendant's motion
to suppress.

The court's order denying Defendant's motion to

suppress was dated July 26, 1994.
4

On August 3, 1994 Defendant

Brent Ziegleman once again filed a petition for permission to file
an interlocutory appeal.

This Court, for a second time, granted

this Defendant's petition, on September 20, 1994.
While a short evidentiary hearing was held in front of Judge
Davis, Defendant alleges that none of the evidence introduced at
that time is significant to this appeal; and the record of that
hearing has not been requested.

All references to the transcript

of the evidentiary hearing will be to the original suppression
hearing held before Hon. George E. Ballif.
On the morning of July 20, 1991, Trooper Lance Bushnell, of
the Utah Highway Patrol was southbound, just south of Nephi, Juab
County, on Interstate 15 (T.7).

He observed a vehicle traveling

north, across the median, and estimated the speed of the other
vehicle at 75 miles per hour (T.8).

He turned and approached the

vehicle from behind, and found that the vehicle was now traveling
at 60 miles per hour (T.9).

At first he saw one head in the car,

and then saw another one come up in the back seat, as if he had
been awakened by the officer's approach.

As he pulled up along

side the vehicle, he intended to give the driver a hand signal to
keep his speed down (T.9).

He did not intend to stop the vehicle,

because he had been unable to pace him and determine for sure that
there had been a speeding violation (T.8-9; 24). The driver and
the passenger, however, stared ahead and would not look at him,
5

"both consciously trying not to look at me. Almost like they were
guilty" (T.10; 29). The officer, acting on the looks of guilt, and
observing

that

both

persons

in the

vehicle

were

"obviously

nervous," initiated a stop. He did not intend to issue a citation;
but did intend to issue a warning and investigate further the
nervousness and "guilty" demeanor (T.31).
Trooper Bushnell asked Mr. Ziegleman, the driver of the
vehicle, for a driver license and vehicle registration.

He was

provided with an insurance paper indicating that the car belonged
to William Kayler, but no registration (T.10-11).

Mr. Ziegleman

gave the name of the owner of the car as "Bill," and said he had
borrowed it for a trip to California and was returning home to
Minnesota.

He didn't seem to remember Bill's last name until he

produced the insurance papers (T.36-37).

Officer Bushnell called

in the car information to his dispatcher to inquire about a
possible stolen vehicle, and received a negative report.

The

occupants remained very nervous and overly polite, which just
increased his suspicions (T.12-13; 43).

Mr. McNaughton was so

nervous that he dropped the contents of his wallet on the ground,
while attempting to look for identification (T.14).

The officer

asked for permission to search the vehicle, after asking if the
vehicle contained drugs, weapons or narcotics (T.12-13).

The

search request was based primarily on the demeanor of the occupants
6

and his feeling that "something was going on" (T.40; 53).
The officer started a search of the vehicle, locating first a
package of rolling papers in a tennis shoe in the back seat (T.14).
Neither occupant would admit ownership of the rolling papers, which
seemed odd, because the papers themselves were not illegal.

By

this time officer Bushnell and the Deputy Sheriff who was with him
(but did not testify) had satisfied themselves that they were going
to find evidence of a crime (T.45, 48).

While the search was

conducted, the Defendants "were both really intent on watching the
car" (T.16).

Eventually the officer searched under the hood, and

found a package of cocaine, approximately 1 kilogram in weight,
under an oily rag near the battery (T.16-17).
under the hood, he was specifically

looking

When he searched
for drugs, and

primarily because of body language (specifically, the Defendants
looked away, as he got closer) he was pretty sure of finding some
(T.44-45, 52-53).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court below did not seriously consider the issue
that was given to it on remand: That of attenuation of the illegal
conduct from the consent to search. The trial court, upon remand,
wrongfully concentrated only on the issue of deterrence, and did
not validly decide the issue.
The Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of
7

the State of Utah, require that a police officer may not use his
own illegal conduct to wrongfully
criminal suspect.

obtain evidence

against a

Despite the State's arguments to the contrary,

this fundamental legal document still holds. Any consent obtained
by Officer Bushnell from Defendant in this action for a search of
the vehicle that Defendant was driving was hopelessly tainted by
his own illegal conduct. There were no intervening factors between
that illegal conduct and the obtaining of the consent. Therefore,
the evidence at issue must be suppressed.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED ON REMAND IN NOT ADDRESSING THE ISSUE
FOR WHICH THIS CASE WAS REMANDED.
When this matter was previously remanded by this Court to the
Trial Court, the Court, in the conclusion of its Memorandum
Decision simply stated:
In view of the State's concessions, the decision of the
trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a
determination as to whether the consent to search was
valid under Thurman. (Memorandum Decision p.3).
Prior to its conclusion, however, the Court also stated:
In view of the State's concession that the consent was
obtained only after an illegal police activity, the
court's finding of consent is now incomplete. The trial
court, on remand, must address "'whether the consent was
obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality'
. . . or, in other words, 'whether the 'taint' of the
Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to
permit introduction of the evidence.'"
Memorandum
Decision Pg. 2.
8

Judge Ballif, the Judge who made the original ruling which was
reversed, retired before the remand.

Therefore, remand was to

Judge Ballif's successor, Hon. Lynn W. Davis.

Right from the

beginning it was clear that Judge Davis did not understand why the
case was remanded.

He said so directly near the beginning of his

ruling, a ruling that reached the same conclusion (although by a
different route) as the original ruling of Judge Ballif.

Judge

Davis started out his discussion with the comment:
This court wonders why the Utah Court of Appeals remanded
this case.
Admittedly, the questions of whether a
defendant's consent was given voluntarily and whether
this consent was obtained by police exploitation of the
prior illegality, are factual questions. But certainly
there appears in the records sufficient findings before
the court in order to apply the Thurman analysis without
the necessity of remand. Defendant argues that the Court
of Appeals remanded the case in order for the trial court
to dismiss the case. That position is not well taken.
The Utah Court of Appeals could have suppressed the
evidence and/or dismissed the case, if it desired. Was
it remanded in order to take additional evidence on the
issue and have the trial court make the Thurman analysis?
The Thurman analysis is a legal analysis and the facts
have already been established. The reason for the remand
is somewhat confusing to this court. (R. 332-3).
Near the end of the trial court's opinion, Judge Davis stated:
This court fully recognizes that its principal focus on
the "purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct"
may result in an additional remand to further examine the
"temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent"
factor as well as "the presence of intervening
circumstance" factor. (R. 339).
In short, the trial court wandered off down a primrose path
which was suggested to it by the State. That path was started upon
9

because of an admitted confusion of the trial court as to why the
case was back there in the first place, and what re-examination
should be made.

In the end, the trial court admitted that it had

not answered the question proposed to it by the Court of Appeals,
and admitted that it may well have to consider the case again on a
further remand.

The trial court was asked to do a job that it

chose not to do.

Because of that failure and refusal, the court

should find error from beginning to end in the trial court's new
ruling, and should once again reverse.

This time, however, the

court should not remand for any further decisions by the trial
court.

The trial court itself stated, correctly, that there were

plenty of facts in the record that first went up to this Court upon
which to base a suppression.

Those facts are still there.

They

have not been added to or changed in any meaningful way. Appellant
implores

this

court

make

its

ruling

final,

complete

and

unequivocal.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE
ON REMAND IS THE FLAGRANCY OF THE OFFICERS CONDUCT.
As set forth above, this court in remanding to the District
Court, asked the District Court to determine whether the admitted
Fourth Amendment detention violation committed by Officer Bushnell
was "sufficiently attenuated" from that illegal conduct to permit
introduction of the evidence in court. The Utah Supreme Court, in
10

State v, Arroyof 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) discussed at some length
the question of whether a consent to a search obtained after
illegal conduct by a police officer, is nevertheless valid.

The

tests set forth by the Supreme Court in that case were as follows:
Two factors determine whether consent to a search is
lawfully obtained following initial police misconduct.
The inquiries should focus on whether the consent was
voluntary and whether consent was obtained by police
exploitation of the prior illegality. Evidence obtained
in searches following police illegality must meet both
tests to be admissible. 796 P.2d at 688.
In discussing the exploitation of the prior misconduct, the
Utah Supreme Court went on to say:
The basis for the second part of the two-part analysis is
found in the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407,
9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963), which stated that a trial court
must determine in such a case n/Whether granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'" 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S. Ct. at 417 (quoting
MaGuire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to
invalidate consents which, despite being voluntary, are
nonetheless the exploitation of a prior police
illegality. 796 P. 2d at 690. [See also State v. GodinaLuna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992).]
Under the reasoning of Arroyo, the State would clearly not
prevail under the facts of this case.

The State has, however,

pointed out most strongly a more recent Utah Supreme Court case
which, according to the State, modifies the test substantially in
its favor. That case, State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)
11

is contended to be a major shift in direction by the Utah Supreme
Court.

To date, this Court has not bought that argument, and as

will be discussed more fully below, there is no reason to do so.
The Utah Supreme Court, in the Thurman case, did not suggest an
overruling of its earlier decision in Arroyo. The state must still
prove that the consent was "not obtained by police exploitation of
the prior illegality".

The Supreme Court, in confirming that,

said:
In sum, to find that a defendant's consent following
police illegality is valid under the Fourth Amendment,
the prosecution must prove (i) that the defendant's
consent was given voluntarily, i.e. , that the consent was
the product of his or her own free will; and (ii) that
the consent was not obtained by exploitation of the prior
illegality, i.e., that the connection between the consent
and the prior illegality was sufficiently attenuated that
excluding the evidence would have no deterrent effect.
846 P.2d at 1265.
Once again, this language from the Utah Supreme Court is
detrimental to the position of the State. The State has therefore
ignored that portion of the Thurman case, and has, somewhat
amazingly, convinced Judge Davis to do the same.

The State,

instead of looking at attenuation, as this court has looked, has
suggested that the Thurman case has effectively overruled much of
Utah case law on the question of suppression, and has gone off in
a new direction.

The Thurman court did engage in a lengthy

discussion of the reason behind the exclusionary rule in Fourth
Amendment cases. The Supreme Court stated:
12

Arroyo's primary goal was to deter the police from
engaging in illegal conduct even though that conduct may
be followed by a voluntary consent to the subsequent
search. 846 P.2d at 1263.
The Thurman court went on to discuss the efforts to deter
further illegal police conduct, and in so doing, discussed how
substantial the illegal conduct may have been on the part of the
officer. Discussing the severity of the illegal conduct, the court
stated:
Where the misconduct is extreme, we will require a clean
break in the chain of events between the misconduct and
the consent to find the consent valid . . . . The same
type of break should be required where the evidence shows
that the police purposely engaged in conduct to induce a
consent.
Conversely, where it appears that the
illegality that arose is the result of negligence, the
lapse of time between the misconduct and the consent and
the presence of intervening events become less critical
to the dissipation of the taint. 846 P.2d at 1264.
The State has suggested here the misconduct of the police
officer in illegally detaining this Defendant, was a "technical"
violation.

The court below bought that argument fully, and said:

This court concludes that since there were no clear court
pronouncements as of July 20, 1991, regarding these type
of questions asked by this officer, his improper
questioning was only a "technical" violation. (R. 340).
Upon remand, and over the objection of Defendant, Officer
Bushnell was once again put on the witness stand and allowed to
testify that he did not understand, at the time of the stop in
question, what the rules were regarding detention of a suspect in
which the original reason for stopping him had been dissipated.
13

The

trial

court

carefully

entered

findings

supporting

that

contention:
1. At the time of the stop, July 20, 1991, there was no
written or verbal policy of the Utah Highway Patrol, or
the officer7s department, proscribing an inquiry of a
driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs
or narcotics in the vehicle.
2. Departmental policy allowed Officer Bushnell to ask
personal questions at the time of the stop; the questions
were not scripted.
3. The questions posed to the driver of this vehicle
were those routinely asked in his law enforcement
practice.
This driver was not singled out for any
reason.
4. Officer Bushnell adjusts his law enforcement
practices based up [sic] training, advice from the county
attorney, based upon Utah Highway Patrol directives and
based upon court decisions.
5. He was not aware through these educational and
training efforts as of July 20, 1991, that any law,
statute, court case prohibited or called into question
his inquiry regarding contraband in a vehicle or a
request to search. As of July 20, 1991, he acted in
conformity with his training and legal advice.
6. Lastly, and most importantly, it is stressed that
Officer Bushnell has abandoned this procedure in light of
court decisions handed down since July 20, 1991. State
v. Godina-Luna 826 P. 2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). No one
would suggest that law enforcement officers should be
clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate decisions.
(R. 339).
It should be noted that the trial court put great faith in the
statements of the officer that he "innocently" broke the law and
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution on
July 20, 1991.

"Most importantly", however, is the fact that
14

Officer Bushnell told the Judge that he does not do that anymore,
and promised to behave in the future. The trial court, therefore,
found that this officer was already rehabilitated and did not have
to be sanctioned in order to get him to stop his illegal conduct.
The court in its ruling stated " . . . this court has principally
focused on 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct'
factor because of the unique facts established at the supplemental
evidentiary hearing" (R. 339).

There is nothing unique at all

about the facts established, to the satisfaction of the court, on
remand.

The officer, after proper coaching, simply went in and

took a properly repentant attitude before the Judge.

Criminal

Defendants are rarely given an opportunity to repent in the same
manner and avoid prosecutions simply because they promise to behave
in the future.

It is interesting to note that those who seek to

widen police powers always seek to minimize their own illegal
conduct as a "technicality".

A violation of the Constitution of

the United States is not a "technicality". The police officer has
violated the law just as surely as the Defendant may have done.
The United States Supreme Court, in an effort to stop the police
from continuing to do that, devised the exclusionary rule, thus
ensuring that illegal conduct on the part of the police will have
its consequences.

Under the reasoning suggested by the trial

court, the police officer is encouraged to resolve any doubt in
15

favor of aggressive conduct, and then to say, "well, I wasn't sure,
so I guessed, and I sure am sorry that I guessed wrong"•

This is

not the purpose of the exclusionary rule, and that is not what the
Thurman court attempted to convey.
Likewise, the authority cited by Appellant to challenge the
continued detention and the investigation of the alleged illegal
behavior, was not new at the time of the stop.

In Utah the major

authority for the proposition that the type of investigation
undertaken by Officer Bushnell was not legal is the case of State
v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990).

The later case of

State v. Godina-Luna is based extensively on the Robinson case; and
the latter case does not break new ground.

In Robinson, as is now

true here, there was no issue as to whether the initial stop of
Defendant was illegal. As in this case, in Robinson, the initial
reason for the stop was taken care of quickly, when a warning
citation was issued.

The Defendant in Robinson was held further,

however, because of a lack of eye contact and nervous conduct. As
in the instant case, the officers in Robinson checked to see if the
vehicle had been reported stolen. In neither case, were there such
reports.

The Robinson court stated:

Even considering all the circumstances facing the
troopers, the fact the defendants could not —
during
the brief time span of the valid traffic stop
produce either written authorization from the owner or a
successful telephone contact with the owner is
insufficient to provide the officers with reasonable
16

suspicion of car theft or other serious crime sufficient
to justify the road-side detention and questioning that
followed.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in
its finding that the troopers had the reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their
continued detention and questioning of Robinson and
Towers once
the warning citation was given and the
purposes for the initial stop had been accomplished.
Defendants7 detention after that point was, therefore, a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. 797 P.2d at
436-7.
The Robinson case was decided one full year prior to the stop at
issue here. The statement by this court, telling Officer Bushnell
(and others) that he could not continue to hold and question a
motorist in a situation such as this, seems to be as clear as it
can be. How much more clear either Officer Bushnell or Judge Davis
would have wanted it, is what is not clear.

Despite Judge Davis7

finding to the contrary, Officer Bushnell did not modify his
behavior after this Court ruled that such behavior was illegal. He
continued it for at least a full year.

Officer Bushnell knew, or

should have known, of the rules set forth by the Robinson court in
dealing with the type of situation that he confronted in this
matter.

He could not have had a good faith belief that his wild

search for something to explain the "guilty" behavior of Defendant
was justified.

The later decisions by this Court that have

continued to strike down this kind of police behavior should have
come as no surprise to Officer Bushnell or to the Attorney General
17

of the State of Utah.

The officer's behavior at the time of the

detention and the search was all one tightly connected stream of
behavior. There is no way that the Thurman case can be used by the
officer to wriggle out of what he should have known at the time he
stopped Defendant:

that he could not detain a Defendant without

articulable suspicion of particular criminal behavior. The Supreme
Court continues to require a break between the illegal behavior and
a search that comes out of it.

There is no such break; and any

consent given by Defendant to the search made by Officer Bushnell
is hopelessly tainted.
POINT III
THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY

NO ATTENUATION

BETWEEN

THE

FOURTH

AMENDMENT VIOLATION AND THE CONSENT TO SEARCH.
In

this

violation.

matter,

we

have

an

admitted

Fourth

Amendment

The State admitted that when this matter was before

this court before.

That admission was part of the basis for this

Court's reversal of the original trial court decision refusing to
suppress the evidence. It is true that the Utah Supreme Court, in
Thurman. stated that less severe acts of misconduct on the part of
a police officer will require less attenuation than more extreme
conduct.

Nevertheless, the Thurman court did not disturb the

requirement "that the consent was not obtained by exploitation of
the prior illegality".
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To date, the State has not given any plausible argument to
suggest that the consent to search obtained by Officer Bushnell was
"sufficiently attenuated" from the illegal conduct in holding
Defendant for further investigation.

In fact, the record is clear

that everything that the officer did was directed towards one
purpose:

To find out why Defendant was acting "guilty" and to

catch him doing something illegal. The officer was convinced, from
the moment he pulled up alongside Defendant's automobile, that
Defendant was "guilty" and he made no apology for that decision in
the suppression hearing. He made no apology for the fact that all
of his conduct from that moment on was designed to catch the
"guilty" person and to see that he was punished for his crime,
whatever crime it might turn out to be. Defendant was stopped for
that purpose, he was held for that purpose, he was questioned for
that purpose, and a search was commenced for that purpose.
The facts set forth in the Thurman case show some rather
outrageous behavior on the part of the police officers involved in
that search.

Nevertheless, the Court found that there was a

substantial "attenuation" between that outrageous conduct and the
consent to the search, which was obtained several hours later. The
Utah Supreme Court made that decision because the actual consent to
search that was at issue was made in writing, was made after
repeated "Miranda warnings" and was made well after the improper
19

police conduct. Additionally, the consent made by Mr. Thurman was
to the search of a storage unit which was completely separate from
the scene where the original police misconduct had occurred.

In

fact, the police did not appear to have any knowledge of the
existence of the storage unit to which they later obtained consent
to search.

Not only did Mr. Thurman consent to the search of the

storage unit, it is apparently he who brought the existence of the
storage unit to the attention of the police; and he did it after he
was warned by the police that he did not have to answer any
questions without an attorney present.

None of those attenuating

circumstances existed in the case of Mr. Ziegleman.

Mr Ziegleman

was being held against his will while Office Bushnell frantically
searched for evidence of some kind of crime.

Unlike Mr. Thurman,

no search warrant was issued at any time by any magistrate
whatsoever; and that additional check on the raw power of the
police did not exist.
Since the Thurman case was decided in January, 1993, the State
has asked this Court to ignore total, or almost total, lack of
attenuation in several instances.
that to succeed.

This Court has never allowed

In State v. Shoulderblade, 258 P.2d 1049 (Utah

App. 1993) cert, granted, 858 P.2d 1049 (Utah 1994), this Court
said:
"The same facts exist here as in Small, which indicate a
very short period of time lapse between the stop of the
20

vehicle at the roadblock and the officer's request to
search the vehicle, and no intervening factors existing
since the consent was obtained during the ongoing
roadblock. Accordingly, the "consent to have the vehicle
searched was not sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the
taint of the illegal roadblock." 858 P.2d 1052-3.
In State v. Hubbard, 861 P.2d 1053 (Utah App. 1993), the court
found that the stop itself was illegal.

Referring to the issue

here, the Court stated:
"We do not address the remaining contentions, including
the State's arguments regarding attenuation, because we
find such contentions to be without merit." 861 P.2d at
1055.
In the case of State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1994)
Cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359, (Utah 1994) This court once again
found insufficient grounds for stopping the Defendant.

The Court

went on to say:
"Despite the illegal stop, it is constitutionally
permissible to admit the evidence recovered as a result
of the search of Bello's vehicle if both prongs of a twopart test are satisfied: (1) the consent was voluntarily
given, and (2) the consent was not obtained through
"exploitation" of the prior illegal police conduct.
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993);
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). 871 P.2d
at 587.
This Court referred to Thurman, and set forth the factors
to be reviewed under that case:
There are three factors to consider in determining
whether the consent in this case was sufficiently
attenuated: (1) the "purpose and flagrancy" of the stop,
(2) the amount of time that had elapsed between the stop
and the consent, and (3) the presence or absence of
"intervening circumstances." 871 P.2d at 588.
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The Court discussed the first prong or factor thusly:
The Utah Supreme Court has explained the "purpose and
flagrancy" factor as directly bearing upon the "deterrent
value" of suppression. Thurmanf 846 P.2d 1263. Specifically, "if the misconduct is flagrantly abusive, there is
a greater likelihood that the police engaged in the
conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives, and
suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the
future." Id. 1264. While the police misconduct in this
case is conduct that should be discouraged, it does not
fall into the category of flagrant abuse. We conclude,
after balancing the value of deterring what virtually
amounts to a random stop against the lack of a flagrant
abuse or improper motivation, that this factor is
neutral. Id.
This Court next discussed the question of time:
With respect to the temporal proximity factor, the record
establishes that very little time passed between the
initial stop and the request for permission to search the
vehicle. Barney asked a few questions about the reason
for the weaving, the identity of the vehicle's owner, and
Bello's destination, along with requesting his license
and registration. A few minutes later, after checking
the information provided by Bello, Barney returned and
asked if he could look in the vehicle. As in State v.
Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991), Cert, granted, 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), a case with facts quite similar to
the instant case, "ft]he consent was obtained within
minutes of the illegal stop, and not even under [a] clear
error standard of review could the trial court find
enough time between the stop and the grant of consent to
attenuate the relationship between the two." Id. 151;
see also State v. Godina Lunaf 826 P. 2d 652, 656 (Utah
App. 1992)("The consent occurred during an ongoing
illegal seizure, thus no time factor separated the
illegality from the consent."). Therefore, the second
factor weighs in favor of suppressing the evidence. Id.
This Court then discussed the final factor and said:
The final factor in the exploitation analysis, whether
there are intervening circumstances, also supports a
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conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed. The
intervening circumstances must be independent of the
illegal conduct. Sims, 808 P.2d at 151. Therefore, the
fact that Barney smelled marijuana when he approached the
car is not an intervening circumstance because the
opportunity to smell the marijuana arose directly from
the illegal stop. See Id. There are no facts in the
record indicating that there were any other independent
intervening circumstances, and accordingly, there was no
opportunity for the taint from the illegal stop to
dissipate through these means. 871 P.2d 588-9.
In the case of State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1994)
this

Court

reversed

a

ruling

of

a

district

court

denying

suppression of evidence after an illegal entry to a home.

While

not directly of precedent value in this instance, it is interesting
to note that the dissent of Judge Bench seemed to mirror the
state's arguments in this case, when he said:
"Because the police misconduct in this case did not
"implicate a fundamental violation of Defendant's
rights," I would affirm the trial court's denial of
Defendant's motion to suppress.
876 P.2d at 403.
The State continues to argue that their violation of the law
does not constitute a "fundamental violation" of constitutional
rights. In the above-referenced case, they did convince one Judge.
The instant case suggests no credible reason why any Judge should
be convinced. This Court recently

addressed

the question of

investigatory automobile stops again, in the DUI case of State v.
Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994).
initial stop to be unlawful.
"Consequently,

the

The Court there found the

The Court, in conclusion stated:

investigating
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officer's

stop

of

defendant's vehicle, although made in good faith reliance
on radioed information, was not lawful• We reverse the
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
all evidence flowing from this seizure and remand for
such proceedings as may now be appropriate." 884 P.2d at
1274.
No final decision was made by this Court regarding the
suppression of the evidence. Nevertheless, the fact that the stop
was illegal once again resulted in a reversal of the denial of the
Motion to Suppress.

This Court has continued to tell the law

enforcement officers of this State that illegal conduct on their
part will result in reaction by this Court. In no single case has
this Court found unlawful conduct on the part of the police
officers to be so inconsequential that no action was taken. Yet,
the State continues to argue their violation of the law is not
important.

Once again, this Court needs to remind them that that

is not so.
Shortly prior to the decision in Thurman, the Utah Supreme
Court decided the case of Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission, 841
P. 2d 6 (Utah 1992).

In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a

search made at an illegal police road block, even though the police
had obtained a consent to search at that road block.

The Supreme

Court therein extended the exclusionary rule to proceedings brought
in front of the Utah State Commission for failure to affix drug-tax
stamps.

The rule appeared clear, after Sims that the search of a

vehicle after an illegal stop and an illegal detention is itself
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illegal, unless there are unusual circumstances which satisfy the
strong burden of proof on the State to show that the consent was
given separately from the stop and the detention.
After Thurman, the Utah Supreme Court had an opportunity to
revisit the Sims case in the companion case of State v. Sims 881
P.2d 840 (Utah 1994).

The State successfully argued that the

attenuation issue should be revisited in Sims, to the point that
the Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to this court for
further review. The criminal appeal raising the same issues raised
in the earlier tax commission casef was the perfect opportunity for
the Utah Supreme Court to overturn its previous rulings, and to
restrict the exclusion of evidence seized illegally.
Utah

Supreme

Court

dismissed

the

writ

of

Instead, the

certiorari

as

improvidently granted, having decided that the issues in Sims were
res judicata.

The State would minimize the significance of this

case, and deny any precedential value.

The significance of State

v. Sims, however, is that, in order to read Thurman as the State
would read it, one would have to imply an overruling of Sims v.
Utah State Tax Commission. Apparently, the Utah Supreme Court does
not read it that way, and has therefore not overruled its first
decision in Sims.
The same issues presented here were recently before the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558
25

(10th Cir. 1994).

The United States District Court for the

District of Utah had previously upheld a search which netted a
quantity of crack cocaine. The Tenth Circuit Court found that, in
a case quite reminiscent of the instant one, continued detention is
unlawful,
satisfied.

after

the

original

reason

for

the

stop

had

been

In that instance, a Utah highway patrol trooper

questioned the validity of a temporary registration sticker. Upon
closer examination, after a stop, it was determined that the
sticker was valid.

Nevertheless, the trooper went on to ask for

identification and vehicle registration.

A continued discussion

resulted in the driver indicating that he did not have a valid
driver's license. The trooper ran a criminal history check, found
a record of a previous conviction, and became more suspicious. The
following then occurred between the officer and Mr. McSwain:
He then asked if they were "packing" any alcohol,
firearms or drugs in the vehicle. After Mr. McSwain
answered in the negative, Trooper Avery asked, "do you
mind if I look?" Mr. McSwain responded, "go ahead."
Trooper Avery said, "why don't you step out a sec?" He
then explained that, because Mr. McSwain's license had
been suspended Mr. Fisher would have to drive. Trooper
Avery searched the interior of the car, conversing with
Mr. McSwain and Mr. Fisher throughout the search.
Trooper Avery specifically asked and received Mr.
Fisher's permission to look inside a brief case lying in
the back seat. He then retrieved the keys from the
ignition and approached the rear of the vehicle. He
asked Mr. McSwain and Mr. Fisher if there were just
clothes in the trunk and they said, "yes."
After
examining several items in the trunk, Trooper Avery found
a green duffle bag. He asked who it belonged to, and Mr.
McSwain said it belonged to him. Trooper Avery opened
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the duffle bag and discovered a set of scales, a gun and
a plastic bag containing a substance which appeared to be
crack cocaine. 29 F.3d at 560.
The Court, after finding that the detention was unlawful next
discussed the search:
A question remains as to whether Mr. McSwain/s consent to
the search of his vehicle cleansed the taint of the
unlawful detention, thereby validating the search. "A
search proceeded by a Fourth Amendment violation remains
valid if the consent to search was voluntary in fact
under the totality of the circumstances." The government
must demonstrate that Mr. McSwain's consent to search is
"sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint of the illegal [detention]." (Citations omitted)
29 F.3d at 562.
In looking at the consent, the Tenth Circuit noted that the
request and consent to search were an integral part of the
continuing illegal detention:
... Trooper Avery failed to specifically inform Mr.
McSwain that he was free to leave the scene or that he
could refuse to give his consent. These are "important
factors in our consideration." Fernandez, 18 F.3d 882;
see also Id. ("Although informing a defendant of his
right to refuse consent is not a prerequisite to
establishing voluntary consent, we consider it a factor
particularly worth noting.") 29 F.3d at 563
Appellant acknowledges that, in State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 403
(Utah App. 1994), this Court declined to rule that Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution specifically requires "informed
consent" to avoid a suppression of evidence.

But, as with the

Tenth Circuit, the lack of such consent is a "factor particularly
worth noting".
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The Court then went on to discuss the same three factors this
Court has used above r referring to them as "Brown Factors",
referring to Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45
L.Ed. 2d 416 (U.S. 1975).

The Court stated:

We next consider the three "Brown Factors." The first
two factors weigh heavily against finding the taint
cleansed. Mr. McSwain consented to the search only a few
minutes after being illegally detained and questioned by
Trooper Avery.
Also, there were absolutely no
intervening circumstances in the short period of time
between the illegal detention and Mr. McSwain7s consent.
These factors both indicate that there was "no break in
the causal connection between the illegality and the
evidence thereby obtained." (Citations omitted) 29 F.3d
at 563.
Finally, the

rest

the

was

not

flagrant, and did not require remedial action by the Court.

The

government's

Court

suggestion

of

Appeals

that

the

firmly

trooper's

put

to

conduct

Court discussed the flagrancy rather thoroughly, and found that
this was the type of conduct for which the remedy of suppression
was fashioned. That incident was remarkably similar to the instant
case.

Therefore, that discussion is set out in full below:

Finally, the third Brown factor — the purpose and
flagrancy of Trooper Avery's conduct — weighs against
finding the taint purged. Trooper Avery testified that
he detained Mr. McSwain only because he routinely
requests a driver's license and registration upon
stopping a vehicle to ensure that the driver is licensed
and is the owner of the vehicle.
The record, however,
suggests that Trooper Avery's aims in this case were not
so narrow. Before he even requested identification and
vehicle registration, Trooper Avery inquired whether Mr.
McSwain had just bought the vehicle and whether he was
just taking a test drive. Requesting identification and
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vehicle registration, Trooper Avery then quizzed the
vehicle's occupants about their travel itinerary. Later,
upon returning their documentation, he asked what they
were doing in Denver and if that was where they lived.
This unnecessary questioning, viewed in its factual
context, suggests that Trooper Avery detained Mr.
McSwain's vehicle with a "quality of purposefulness,"
Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, embarking upon
a fishing expedition "in the hope that something might
turn up," id. Cf. Fernandez, 18 F.3d at 833 (finding
"quality of purposefulness" because officer detained
driver based "solely on a tension in the air and his
vague hunch that something was afoot, with the hope that
something might turn up") (internal quotations omitted);
Peters, 10 F. 3d at 1523 (finding flagrant misconduct
where agent stopped a vehicle "solely on an unsupported,
inarticulable 'hunch'" supplied by another officer who
previously had stopped and searched the vehicle and found
no evidence of drugs or illegal activity). Considering
the totality of the circumstances and giving special
emphasis to the three Brown factors, we conclude that Mr.
McSwain's consent was not "sufficiently an act of free
will to purge the primary taint of the illegal
[detention]." Maez . 872 F.2d at 1453.
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the law as set forth in the Robinson case, and was engaged in with
the same "quality of purposefulness" as that in McSwain.

Maybe

Officer Bushnell will not do it again. The Defendant suggests that
the officer will be sorely tempted to do so if he finds that his
conduct bears no consequences.
The State has tried to convince this Court that it has, in the
past, gone too far in suppressing evidence, and has gone beyond
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

This

recent case is a firm statement that this is not true. The United
States Constitution does protect Mr. Ziegleman from the kind of
conduct admitted here by Officer Bushnell.

The Constitution

requires the same result here as in McSwain, that the evidence be
suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant Brent Ziegleman was illegally held or "seized" by
Officer

Bushnell

investigation.

on

July

20,

1991,

pending

an

illegal

Any search was a "fruit of the poison tree"

resulting from the illegal detention.

Because the evidence to be

used against this Defendant by the State was seized as a result of
unlawful proceedings by the Utah Highway Patrol, use of that
evidence must be suppressed; and the ruling of the court below
denying the suppression should be reversed.
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January 14, 1992, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On July 20, 1991 on 1-15 within Juab County, Utah, Trooper
Lance Bushnell, a four year veteran of the Utah Highway Patrol,
observed

a motor

vehicle

in the

area

of

Nephi, and

visually

estimated the speed to be in excess of 70 m.p.h., approximately 75
m.p.h., but was unable to obtain a radar reading on the vehicle.
The officer had received training and certification in estimating
of speeds.
2.

The officer turned and followed the vehicle to obtain a

paced speed, but the vehicle had slowed and was now traveling 60
m.p.h..

He then pulled alongside the vehicle with the intent of

giving the driver a hand signal to slow down.

Neither the driver

nor the passenger would look towards him so he could signal them
to slow down.

The officer then stopped the vehicle with the intent

of giving the driver a warning concerning his speeding.
3.

The driver of the vehicle was the defendant, Brent Lee

Ziegleman, with one other passenger in the vehicle, the defendant,
Michael McNaughton.
4.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer approached the

driver and asked for a driver's license and registration.

The

driver produced a driver f s license, but was unable to produce a
registration.

The driver claimed the owner's name was "Bill" and
2

n

: ien*i a i hp h ^ b o r r o w p d

-.-J;:

* "•*

'

'"^ '

;

* i " iu
,* P

Luc

-41-^-

^r!tv-;i J it .

extremelv nervour-

possession 01 *.;

,

registrar.!' D . he

; t-h thn han-^

' -

™ --,«•--

ilclu n u

vehicle.

''he offir-f,y- r ^ r — ^

v^h ;r " * unuuyn Uie .
_ ,fv-

_
negat /.»•

^TP^^1

ippeare*-

t r,e -Micer

^hp

-ontinued *-o . :*•, -*"igatr

officer

\

possibilir.v

s

^r*~szr~

stolen "oh i ^

requebu

\sked

dri.or

i

if there-

w e a p o n s , drugr
Was

1 lO t

ai i'i

. a^w.i

, .iu... a b K c U

. .

';il^eUf

- :i

Ziegleman unhesitatingly replied "help yourself11.
j .

11: f i r* P i' t h e n

T" 111

found noth..., .: substance.

I I in» ^ » • I it i i ' I i' f\ i in i I

'

The officer. t:.hun askea for consent •

sear^'ri tiv trunk, ^hich ^*rsenr w,^Again no c

*

hood area.

Bctweei,

i*

given

t hr» driver.
,* >,i n In L he

- . -yiis.

:I,MIT

lender

*-<j ••

fcartery

w a s an

cloth covering a brown grocery sack with a kilogram of cocaine

ft.

Both defendants were then arrested for possessing cocaine
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with the intent to distribute.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The stop of the defendants1 vehicle by Trooper Bushnell

1.

for speeding based upon his visual estimate was lawful based upon
reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law.
2.

The

continued

detention

of the defendants

after the

initial stop for speeding, was justified based upon the defendants
inability

to

produce

a

registration

for

the

vehicle

or

any

authority to be in possession of the vehicle.
3.

The defendant, Ziegleman, voluntarily

consented

to a

search of the vehicle by the officer without any coercion or duress
by the officer.
4.

Neither defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy

to the hood area of the subject vehicle, and therefore did not have
standing to object to a search of that area of the vehicle.
5.

Both defendants1 Motions to Suppress should be denied.
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• in
. eiiocutory appeal, defendant challenges the
denial of his motion to suppress evi dence.

ii." . . -= . :u« •_
defendant was legally stopped
xi)
for speeding; (2) conm e n t i o n after the stop was
J
ified; and
defendant voluntarily consented to a search, of
L U K vehicle. Alternatively, the trial court ruled that (•)
defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of the v e n i c e .
ippeal, defendant challenges all four of these rulings.

1

The Stop

The trial court found the stop
officer's reasonable suspicion of a violation of state law. The
officer testified that he stopped defendant to issue him a
warning citation, after having visually estimated the speed
defendant's vehicle to be 75 m.p.h. Since there is evidence to
support the trial court's finding, we i lphold the validity
:" the
strop.

2.

Continued Detention

After having verified that the vehicle had not been reported
stolen, the officer asked defendant whether there were any
weapons or narcotics in the vehicle. On appeal, the State
concedes that this question exceeded the scope of detention for a
routine traffic stop and that the question was unrelated to the
issue of whether the vehicle was stolen. The State therefore
concedes "that the continued detention of defendant violated the
fourth amendment." Because of this concession, we reverse the
trial court's determination that continued detention was
justified.
3.

Consent

In view of the State's concession that the consent was
obtained only after an illegal police activity, the court's
finding of consent is now incomplete. The trial court, on
remand, must address "'whether the consent was obtained by police
exploitation of the prior illegality' . . . or, in other words,
'whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment violation was
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence.'11
See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993) (citations
omitted).
4.

Standing

The State also concedes that defendant has standing to
challenge the search of the vehicle. Because of this concession,
we reverse the trial court's alternative holding that defendant
lacked standing.

CONCLUSION
11 i , ie J1 of the State's concessioi is , t: 1 1 e d e c i s i o i 1 of t: 1: Ie
trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for a
determination as to whether the consent to search v/as valid under
Thurman
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

Ruling on Defendant's Motion Suppress
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 82E

vs.
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
BRENT LEE ZIEGELMAN
Defendant.
Judge George E. Ballif, now retired, denied defendant's motion to suppress in a
ruling dated January 14, 1992. That ruling was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. In a
Memorandum Decision dated September 9,1993, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court based upon several concessions by the State of Utah. The Court of
Appeals remanded the case for determination as to whether the consent to search was valid
under Thurman. The Remittitur was filed with the Clerk of the District Court on October 18,
1993.
On November 29, 1993, a conference call was conducted by the court. The
purpose was for the court to determine if the parties wished a further evidentiary hearing or
whether they wished the court to make the Thurman analysis from the record of the
suppression hearing conducted on November 15, 1991, before Judge Ballif. The parties did
not want to foreclose any options, so the court requested briefing and scheduled a hearing
date to take evidence and to entertain legal argument. Counsel for defendant filed a
"Request for Further Evidentiary Hearing and Demand for Speedy Trial" on November 19,
1993.
A hearing was scheduled on January 28, 1994. The State of Utah submitted
extensive briefing on January 3, 1994. Defendant relied upon his original Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in support of the Motion to Suppress Evidence which was filed on

October 15, 1991.
Subsequent to the hearing, defendant filed a Supplementary Memorandum on March
31, 1994. The State then filed "State's Response to Defendant's Supplemental
Memorandum" about April 4, 1994. During the pendency of this case, counsel have alerted
the court of the status of various cases now pending before Utah's appellate courts. The
court, having entertained the arguments of counsel, reviewed the various memoranda, and
otherwise being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following:
Ruling
I.
Issue
The sole issue before the court is whether the consent to search in this traffic stop
was valid under a Thurman analysis. * Because Judge Ballif found no prior illegality, he did
not address the validity of defendant's consent under the second prong of the Arroyo Thurman test. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded this case for the sole purpose of
having this court evaluate:
"Whether the consent was obtained by police expectation of the prior illegality...or,
in other words, whether the 'taint' of the Fourth Amendment valuation was
sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the evidence." State v. Ziegleman,
unpublished memorandum decision dated September 9, 1993, at 2
This court wonders why the Utah Court of Appeals remanded this case.
Admittedly, the questions of whether a defendant's consent was given voluntarily and
whether this consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality, are factual
questions. But certainly there appears in the record sufficient findings before the court in
order to apply the Thurman analysis without the necessity of remand. Defendant argues that
the Court of Appeals remanded the case in order for the trial court to dismiss the case. That
position is not well taken. The Utah Court of Appeals could have suppressed the evidence
and/or dismissed the case, if it desired. Was it remanded in order to take additional evidence

on the consent issue and have the trial court make the Thurman analysis? The Thurman
analysis is a legal analysis and the facts have already been established. The reason for the
remand is somewhat confusing to this court. Nevertheless, the court scheduled a
supplementary evidentiary hearing. This court has no intention of disturbing the facts as
previously determined by Judge George Ballif at the suppression hearing conducted by him.

n
Facts
The facts as established by Judge Ballif at the suppression hearing are not in dispute
as to the consent issue. This court conducted the supplementary hearing.
This court, therefore, specifically adopts the Findings of Fact of Judge Ballif dated
March 24, 1992, consisting of paragraphs 1-8. In addition, this court specifically finds the
following from the supplemental evidentiary hearing:
1. Officer Lance Bushnell stated that as of the date of the stop, July 20, 1991,
there was no written or verbal policy of his department, the Utah Highway patrol,
proscribing an inquiry of a driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or
narcotics in the vehicle.
2. Officer Bushnell testified that department policy allowed him to ask personal
questions at a stop; the questions are not scripted.
3. Officer Bushnell testified that it was his practice to routinely ask whether there
was any contraband in stopped vehicles. Ziegleman and McNaughton were not singled out
for any reason.
4. Officer Bushnell further testified that his law enforcement practices are guided
by P.O.S.T. training, by legal advice from the county attorney, from reading court decisions,
and from departmental directive.
5. Officer Bushnell testified that at the time of the stop, he was not aware of any
law, statute, or court case which would have prohibited, or called into question, his inquiry

regarding contraband and a request to search.
6. He further testified that he, therefore, proceeded under the law at the time and
that his procedure and behavior were proper and that he acted in conformity with the legal
advise he had been given.
7. Lastly, he testified that he has now abandoned this procedure in light of new
case law decisions handed down since this stop and upon advice of counsel.

m
Discussion
For the most part, the State's analysis of State v. Arroyo , 796 P.2d 684 (1990),
and State v. Thurman , 846 P.2d 1256 (1193), is accurate. Determining whether a
defendant's consent to a search following illegal police action is valid under the Fourth
Amendment, requires inquiry into (1) whether the consent was given voluntary, and (2)
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. Thurman at
1262.
A
The First Prong Voluntariness of the Consent
After the officer asked the driver if there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in
the vehicle, the driver said there were not any. The officer then asked for consent to
search. Mr. Ziegleman unhesitantly replied "help yourself." (See findings of Judge Ballif,
No 6.)
The officer then searched the interior of the vehicle and found nothing of substance.
The officer then asked for consent to search the trunk, which consent was again given by
the driver. Again no contraband was found. Officer Bushnell then searched the hood area
where the cocaine was discovered. (See findings of Judge Ballif, No 6) This court
emphasizes that consent was sought and granted in two instances as the level of intrusion and
search increased. The response in each instance was affirmative.
The State argues that the first prong is met because the defendant "never alleged

that his consent was not given voluntarily." State's Memorandum at 10. However, H(t)he
prosecution bears the burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary."
Thurman at 1263 (citations omitted). The only proof offered by the State is that "Trooper
Bushnell's uncontroverted testimony was that defendant in fact consented to the search."
State's Memorandum at 11 (citing Sepulveda).
Despite the State's assertion that H(t)he first prong... is not at issue," IJL* "whether
the requisite voluntariness exists depends on the totality of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of police conduct." Thurman at 126263 (citations omitted). Whether the defendant's consent was actually a product of his or her
free will is a factual question. "The analysis used to determine voluntariness is the same
without regard to whether the consent was obtained after illegal police conduct." LdL. at
1262. In the case at hand, this issue is not as clear cut as the state asserts.
The burden never shifts to the defendant to show that the consent was involuntary.
The burden always rests with the state to show that the consent was voluntary. The state
argues that the defendant has never alleged that his consent was involuntary.

But Thurman

holds that the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the consent was given voluntarily.
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993). Given the state's burden of proof on
this issue, it may be inappropriate for the state to require the defendant to allege involuntary
consent; rather whether the consent was given voluntarily must be part of the state's
affirmative burden of proof.
This court, after consideration of the totality of the circumstances, concludes that
the consent to search was freely and unequivocally given. The court relies upon the
following in reaching that conclusion:
1. Officer Lance Bushnell was the only witness called by the State and his
testimony was undisputed;
2. Defendant did not choose to attend the supplemental hearing to dispute the
officer's version;

3. The initial consent was given unhesitatingly; the defendant did not delay in his
response nor did he equivocate;
4. This court considers a "help yourself response to Officer Bushnell's inquiry to
be unequivocal,absent any testimony to the contrary;
5. There is no testimony that the defendant revoked or attempted to revoke his
consent at any stage.
6. The evidence is uncontroverted that the defendant reconfirmed his consent as the
search proceed beyond the initial interior search. Officer Bushnell asked the
defendant if he could look in a duffel bag that was in the trunk, and the defendant
said "go ahead."
B.
The Second Prong Whether the Consent
was Obtained by Police Exploitation of the Prior Illegality
It is uncontested that Officer Bushnell, after making the stop, asked to search the
vehicle. It is the defendant's position that the consent obtained is vitiated because the
detention unlawfully continued after any lawful and proper purpose had passed.
The state's interpretation of the second prong as set forth in Thurman is correct.
Thurman does seem to base the need for suppression of evidence obtained from consent
following illegal police action on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Three
factors are to be considered to determine whether or not to permit the introduction of the
evidence resulting from consent after a police illegality--(l) "the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct," (2) the "temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent," and (3)
"the presence of intervening circumstances. "Id. at 1263.
The state claims that the Thurman court analysis of the first "purpose and
flagrance" factor is controlling in the present case. The court analyzes this factor as follows:
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. Thus, if the police had no "purpose" in engaging in
the misconduct-for example, if the illegality arose because we later invalidated a
statute on which the police had relied in good faith-suppression would have no

deterrent value
Id, at 1263-64 (citations omitted). If this is the case, then the court seems to indicate that
further analysis is not required. The state claims that the present case is akin to this
scenario.
This case does not involve good faith reliance upon a statute which was later
invalidated. There were, at best, conflicting cases in the Tenth Circuit and no Utah court
ruling on the issue of whether the officer's questions was in violation of the defendant's
rights. The instant case, though distinguishable on the facts, is sufficiently akin to
"statute/revocation" scenario to merit the same analysis and the same result. While it may
be a close call, it appears to this court that the state's emphasis on the "purpose and
flagrancy" factor is accurate because of the facts brought out at the supplementary hearing.
The state has de-emphasized the other important factors of temporaral proximity and the
presence of intervening circumstances. But the state argues that because there was no clear
court pronouncements regarding these types of questions asked by the arresting officer, his
improper questioning was only a "technical" violation. This argument, thought fairly
complex, appears to be sound in light of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Brown v.
Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, (1975).
This court agrees with the state's position that Officer Bushnell could have
detained defendant to further investigate defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration
form or evidence of his entitlement to use the vehicle. Cf. Robinson. 797 P.2d at 435 (once
a driver has produced evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to
proceed, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning).
Consequently, under Walker Bushnell's conduct was arguably permissible because it did not
delay the stop beyond the time necessary to investigate the issue of whether defendant had
permissive use of the vehicle.
Indeed, since the time of the stop that occurred here, the Court of Appeals has
similarly recognized that the "running of a warrants check in the course of a traffic stop is

permissible, so long as it does not significantly extend the period of detention beyond that
reasonably necessary to effectuate the original purpose of the stop. "Steve v. FigueroaSolorio. 830 P.2d 276, 280 (Utah App. 1992).
Two contemporaneous decisions from the California courts reflect a split similar to
that evidenced in the decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Compare People
v.Lusardi. 228 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 280 Cal. Rpter. 80, 81 (Cal. Super. 1991) ("Officers
making a proper traffic (stop) cannot, on mere hunch, properly ask for consent to search (;)
the consent obtained is vitiated because the detention unlawfully continued after any lawful
and proper purpose has passed"); with People v. Galindo. 229 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1529,
218 Cal. Rptr. 155, 158 (Cal. App. 1991) (Officer's post-citation inquiry of defendant which included whether there were any guns or drugs in the car and request for permission
to search car-was proper).
This court further agrees with the state's position, under the facts of this case, that
Officer Bushnell could have detained defendant's vehicle based on defendant's failure to
produce proper vehicle registration. He also could have continued to investigate his
suspicion that the vehicle was stolen. Utah had yet to address the issue of whether it was
permissible for an officer, in the course of a routine traffic stop, to ask the question posed by
Bushnell. In light of the conflicting opinions from other courts on the issue presented, it
cannot be said that the trooper's asking defendant whether there were any weapons or
narcotics in the vehicle constituted flagrant misconduct or even a negligent violation of the
law. Moreover, the encounter was- not merely a routine traffic stop, but instead involved
defendant's failure to produce a vehicle registration form and to demonstrate permissive use
of the vehicle beyond asserting that a friend identified only as "Bill" had loaned him the car.
Since this case is akin to one in which "the illegality arose because (a court) later
invalidated a statue on which the police had relied in good faith (;) suppression would
(therefore) have no deterrent value." Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1264 (citation omitted).
Consequently, the absence of a temporal break or other intervening circumstance between the

asking of the improper question and defendant's consent to search in inconsequential. See
generally. Brown. 422 U.S. at 611-12.
This court fully recognizes that its principal focus on the "purpose and flagrancy of
the official misconduct" may result in an additional remand to further examine the "temporal
proximity of the illegality and the consent" factor as well as "the presence of intervening
circumstance" factor. Nonetheless, this court has principally focused on "the purpose and
flagrancy of the official misconduct" factor because of the unique facts established at the
supplemental evidentiary hearing. Consider:
1. At the time of the stop, July 20, 1991, there was no written or verbal policy of
the Utah Highway Patrol, or the officer's department, proscribing an inquiry of a
driver of a vehicle whether there were any weapons, drugs or narcotics in the
vehicle.
2. Departmental policy allowed Officer Bushnell to ask personal questions at the
time of a traffic stop; the questions were not scripted.
3. The questions posed to the driver of this vehicle were those routinely asked in
his law enforcement practice. This driver was not singled out for any reason.
4. Officer Bushnell adjusts his law enforcement practices based up training, advice
from the county attorney, based upon Utah Highway Patrol directives and based
upon court decisions.
5. He was not aware through these educational and training efforts as of July 20,
1991, that any law, statute, court case prohibited or called into question his inquiry
regarding contraband in a vehicle or a request to search. As of July 20, 1991, he
acted in conformity with his training and legal advice.
6. Lastly, and most importantly, it is stressed that Officer Bushnell has abandoned
this procedure in light of court decisions handed down since July 20, 1991. State v. GodinaLuna 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). No one would suggest that law enforcement officers
should be clairvoyant enough to divine future appellate decisions.
It is clear that the suppression of the evidence in this case would, therefore, have
absolutely no deterent effect whatsoever because this officer's routine has long since

comported with new caselaw which gave him guidance. This court concludes that since there
were no clear court pronouncements as of July 20, 1991, regarding these type of questions
asked by this officer, his improper questioning was only a "technical" violation. A technical
violation does not necessarily require suppression of the seized cocaine, because it is clear
that here would be no deterrent effect. Officer Bushnell long ago abandoned these inquiries
when the position was clarified. His practice has been consistent with law. The deterrence
rationale discussed in Arroyo is mooted by his volunteer abandonment of the challenged
inquiry. No deterrent purpose in implicated or served in this case by suppressing the
cocaine.
This court characterizes the nature and degree of the prior illegality as technical and
not flagrant or egregious. It does not rise to the level of willful or even negligent
misconduct even though Officer Bushnell exceeded the permissible scope of detention.
Decision
Based upon the above facts and discussion, Officer Bushnell could have properly
detained the defendant to verify his entitlement to utilize the vehicle even though he exceeded
the scope of detention when he asked Mr. Ziegleman whether there were any weapons or
narcotics in the vehicle. As of July 20, 1991, that inquiry was not proscribed by Utah
caselaw, by statute, or by departmental policy and was, therefore, arguably proper under the
law as of that date.
Under the reasoning of Arroyo, as recently "clarified" by the Utah Supreme Court
in Thurman. defendants volunteer and unequivocable consent to search was not obtained by
law enforcement exploitation of a prior illegality. In light of the discussion above, there
would be absolutely no deterrent effect accomplished by suppressing the cocaine seized from
the vehicle.
Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied and the clerk of the court is
instructed to set this case for jury trial forthwith.
Dated this

day of May, 1994.
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TODD A. UTZINGER (6047)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
IN.THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

vs.
CASE NO. 82E
BRENT LEE ZIEGLEMAN,
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS
Defendant.

For the reasons stated in the Court's May 27, 1994
"Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress," defendant's motion to
suppress should be and hereby is DENIED.
Dated this pLC

day of July, 1994.
BY THE COURT

